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DISCUSSION RESPONSE
Lawfare? We need the 
states to interpret 
international humanitarian 
law
A response to Raphael Schäfer
Raphael Schäfer has thoughtfully worked out the main issues 
surrounding lawfare and counter-lawfare. I will take up his 
analysis and develop it further in order to provide a 
complementary perspective. I will explain the struggles over 
the law – quickly termed “counter-lawfare” by some –as the 
ordinary course rather than the exception.
Lawfare and Counter-Lawfare: Breaking the law

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Raphael distinguishes between lawfare usually conducted by 
armed non-state actors (NSA) and counter-lawfare as the 
states’ response. Lawfare entails a deliberate breach of one’s 
own legal duties to make compliance with legal obligations 
unbearable for the adversary. For example, when Hamas 
hides in hospitals, the principle of distinction and the status 
of hospitals appear to disadvantage Israel: Israel may comply 
with the law and accept strategic military disadvantage, or 
attack arguably in violation of international humanitarian 
law (IHL), and thereby suffer indirect disadvantage because 
it will be stigmatized in public as a lawbreaker – so goes the 
rationale of lawfare. Counter-lawfare describes the state’s 
response which does not mean actual military action, but 
legal argumentation.
Lawfare and counter-lawfare, in this sense, are understood 
effectively as breaking the rules: lawfare as a conscious 
violation, and counter-lawfare as a “wrong” interpretation of 
the law. Moreover, both utilize IHL in the political process: 
by stigmatizing the opponent as a law-breaker, and by 
legitimizing one’s own action, respectively. Yet, there are 
fundamental differences on the legal side. Lawfare does not 
carry a legal claim: it neither purports to interpret the law 
nor to legally justify the conduct. Doctrinally, such non-state 
practice does not qualify as relevant (state) practice. 
Counter-lawfare, on the contrary, appears in the form of 
legal argumentation.
I would like to offer a more nuanced view than Raphael on 
what he terms counter-lawfare. Basically, I take issue with 
his distinction between “regime-immanent vs. intended 
interpretations”. While Raphael seems to acknowledge that 
there is no objective interpretation – he sets “correct” in 
quotation marks in connection with interpretation – he 
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appears to equate flawed interpretations with intended and 
politicized interpretations. I agree that some interpretations 
go beyond what is methodologically permissible and may be 
considered outside the regime, thus not “regime-immanent”. 
In my view, however, intentions and political considerations 
do not per se make an interpretation invalid, but are natural 
features of interpretation and inevitable in a system of auto-
interpretation where legal rules are interpreted by the 
addressees themselves.
IHL in political discourse
Why are states so concerned not to appear as lawbreakers 
although the risk to end up before an (international) court 
for breaches of IHL is effectively very low? IHL is not 
designed for judicial settlement, but is in fact rather 
discursive. Warring parties worry about public opinion and 
political discourse to which legal arguments have become 
central. The label of (il)legality regularly replaces genuinely 
political or ethical arguments, and accounts for publicly 
perceived (il)legitimacy of military action.
Since many of the founding premises of IHL are unpopular – 
or would be if they were known to the general public – 
states are often inclined to avoid public statements on IHL. 
Already the basic permissions of killing humans and 
collateral damage face public concern. Germany recently 
experienced this when it refused to sign the Oslo Safe 
Schools Declaration. The German position that schools are 
implicitly already sufficiently protected in IHL may well 
accord with existing law, however, the government faced 
harsh critique.
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Instead of shying away from public condemnation, states 
can actively promote their legal positions. With law’s 
legitimizing function in mind, coating their interest in legal 
argumentation may advance their positions in the political 
sphere. Of course, they may be inclined to employ the 
interpretation of the law that best serves their interest. 
While the argument is brought forward in political fora, it is 
legal in nature and raises the question which interpretations 
are legally permissible and which are beyond the confines of 
legality. I submit that including political considerations into 
the interpretive process is not the red line when states 
interpret IHL. The finding that extra-legal considerations 
guide the choice among several legally permissible 
interpretations goes already back to Hans Kelsen. The issue 
becomes one of allocating competence in a legal order to 
choose one interpretation over the others.
Auto-interpretation is the default
Auto-interpretations should be scrutinized with a degree of 
skepticism, in particular where there is no central decision-
making or interpreting institution, as Raphael argues. Yet, I 
would like to point to the other side of the coin: it is because 
there is no central institution that we need states’ auto-
interpretations. Of course, it may be problematic with a view 
to law’s fairness and legitimacy that states make and 
interpret the law while NSA should follow. However, 
doctrinally only state action shapes the law.
For these reasons states should rather be encouraged to 
openly pronounce their views of the law; otherwise many 
provisions remain an empty shell, and other actors will fill it 
with their content. Raphael refers to the ICRC’s Interpretive 
Guidance in this regard. Similar projects abound – starting 
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from the 1994 San Remo Manual on Naval Warfare to the 
2013 Tallinn Manual on Cyberwarfare, or NGO activism like 
the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. Each outcome may be 
commendable – but what is the value when states do not 
agree? We may call the reactions to the Interpretive 
Guidance “intended interpretations” as Raphael does – but I 
would submit that in this sense the Interpretive Guidance is 
an intended interpretation itself. In a time of flourishing 
counter-terrorism operations and targeted killings, such an 
interpretation promoting the humanitarian principle of IHL 
vis-à-vis military necessity was itself a political move. Thus, I 
would object to disposing of certain interpretations for 
being politically motivated or “intended”.
As Janina Dill pointed out in a conference on “Legitimacy 
and Law-Making in International Humanitarian Law” in 
November 2015 in Berlin, we need a better understanding of 
what abuse and (counter-)lawfare are, and, moreover, that 
not every purpose-driven interpretation constitutes 
(counter-)lawfare. Of course, we have to critically assess 
every interpretation, and conflicting unilateral 
interpretations can unsettle a normative order. Nonetheless, 
from the point of the law it appears more desirable to have 
engaged relevant actors who take clear legal positions and 
face contestation than hesitant states who keep the law 
indeterminate. We may regret that IHL is not a detached and 
pure ad legal field, but part of the political discourse – or we 
may face it, and look for the best response which may be to 
foster open interpretive struggles that can potentially build 
consensus around what humane warfare means in practice 
today.
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